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Abstract
In a continuously evolving world system, it is more crucial than ever for the European
Union (EU) to work as a cohesive and unified bloc. Yet this is hindered by the EU’s inability to
fully integrate member states and its futile enlargement objectives. The EU’s ambitions in the
Western Balkans include a full implementation of European values within the region by making
membership an incentive. This tactic is two-fold; it increases the EU’s influence in the Western
Balkans by negating Russia’s power, and it unifies a larger portion of the continent. However, the
current enlargement policy is not sufficient enough to withstand Kosovo’s disputed independence.
This debate creates a dichotomy between member states that support Kosovo’s independence and
those that do not. Thus, this paper aims to answer the question of how much is Serbia willing to
compromise in order to become an EU member state, and how much is the EU willing to
compromise to strengthen its influence in the Western Balkans. To do so, a case study comparing
Serbia and Croatia’s accession processes will be presented. This paper will analyze the effect
Kosovo’s status will have on the accession process in terms of member state consensus. Finally,
this paper will advance recommendations for ways in which the EU can adjust the accession for
the special case of Serbia in order to maintain influence in the Western Balkans.
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Introduction
Kosovo is a small nation whose statehood is disputed globally. As it stands, Kosovo faces
a dichotomy in relation to its autonomy; it is considered both an independent enclave of Serbia
and a sovereign and independent state. Serbia vehemently denies Kosovo’s independence, which
is also disputed amongst the European Union (EU) member states. Despite the lack of an explicit
clause, Kosovo’s recognition is an implied condition of Serbia’s membership. Serbia’s chances
of EU accession remain unlikely as long as the Kosovo question remains unsettled. Thus, this
paper aims to answer the question of how much is Serbia willing to compromise in order to
become an EU member state, and how much is the EU willing to compromise to strengthen its
influence in the Western Balkans. Additionally, the study will explore the constraints that
member state consensus places on enlargement in the Western Balkans, and how this affects the
regions’ relations with Russia. The objective of this paper overall is to use Serbia-Kosovo
relations as a focal point that will examine policy consensus amongst EU member states in terms
of EU enlargement policy. Furthermore, a case study comparing Serbia’s candidacy status and
Croatia’s accession process will be subsequently presented in order to highlight the EU’s
willingness to adapt for Western Balkan enlargement. The objective is to reveal the tactics that
need to be adjusted in order for the EU to proceed with Serbia’s accession and the special case of
Kosovo. This study argues that a special clause needs to be included in Serbia’s accession
negotiations regarding Kosovo, and conclusory observations will present what the
aforementioned clause should entail.

Literature Review
Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans
In 2018 the EU unveiled a new enlargement strategy meant to facilitate Western Balkan
alignment with EU values and standards. Bonomi (2019) argues that European integration from
this point onward will need to adapt, and new combinations of bargaining will arise. In order for
enlargement to be successful in the Western Balkans, the EU needs to adjust its integration
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process and negotiations considering each state in the Western Balkans has a history of conflict
with other actors in the region. This paper underscores this assertion by arguing that Serbia’s
accession process needs to be approached differently than enlargement in the past due to the
dispute over Kosovo’s independence. It is a new beast per se, in the sense that no state has
entered the EU while also having a recently seceded territory with its own accession aspirations.
Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) present an argument along these lines, stating that Serbia’s
accession process treats Europeanization as a policy rather than the ultimate goal. This study will
expand on this argument by providing evidence of Serbia’s unique accession process and
comparing it to that of Croatia’s. Kosovo shows it is willing to dedicate itself to the European
identity. However, Serbia’s public attitude towards the EU is waning, which forces the EU to
adapt if it wants to be successful in enlargement as well as support Kosovo’s independence. The
EU’s ability to adapt its foreign policy and enlargement strategies can be described as principled
pragmatism. According to Juncos (2017), this consists of a balancing act from the EU side
between European values and compromises that arise from Western Balkan integration. The
concept of principled pragmatism is relevant to Serbia – and eventually Kosovo’s – accession.
The EU needs to take into account the reality of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, seeing as
it is not a typical issue that can be fixed with traditional diplomacy. Ensuring the Western
Balkans adheres to EU values for the long-term will require the right configuration of power and
interests, as Juncos states. This paper will use the three aforementioned arguments to highlight
the fact that the case of Serbia’s accession is unlike anything the EU has dealt with before, and
thus new methods and strategies are necessary to move forward. Through a comparison with
Croatia’s accession, this study will highlight the areas in which reconfiguration is needed.
European Union Theories of Bargaining Power
Only 23 member states formally recognize Kosovo as an independent state and despite
this majority, the five that do not acknowledge its independence hold more bargaining power
over the majority. This puzzle will be addressed in the following sections in order to explore the
individual power that certain member states have over this matter and ultimately the enlargement
process as a whole. Such bargaining power, according to Konig and Slapin (2006), makes itself
increasingly present when there is a dispute at hand. This study utilizes this argument and
ascertains that the minority of member states have more power over the Kosovo dispute than the
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EU would like to admit, which drastically changes the way enlargement and Serbia’s accession
need to be approached. Furthermore, certain member states that align with Serbia have distinct
qualities that give them more bargaining power; their proximity to Russia and relatively new
status as a member state. This study argues that power in this regard is indicative of member
states’ chances of being a pivotal player in negotiations. This claim is based on Bailer (2010),
who claims that current distributions of power favor big and nearly-big member states, such as
Spain, but also give smaller EU member states more voting power and influence than economic
size would indicate.
Competition for Western Balkan Influence: Russia versus the European Union
Enlargement in the Western Balkans is a geopolitical strategy that strengthens the EU
bloc and creates a regional blockade to Russian power. Russia’s overarching goal in the Western
Balkans is to repudiate Europeanization and integration and assert influence in order to create
regional competition. This assertive policy has not reversed the region’s European integration
(Secrieru 2019), but it has created insecurity about the benefits of EU membership. This paper
expands Secrieru’s argument that the EU needs to pursue more vigorous pushback policies
against Russia in the region. Furthermore, this study suggests the way to do this is through
stronger efforts to sustain and encourage integration and enlargement. Thus, Serbia becomes a
strategic tool to thwart Russian influence and must be integrated sooner rather than later, making
the Kosovo dispute a time-sensitive issue. Van Ham (2014) states that the EU’s leverage over the
Western Balkans is dwindling and becoming more obsolete. This study uses this author’s claims
as a reason to reform the current enlargement policy. This is due to the fact that as the EU’s
attractiveness wanes, opportunities arise for outside actors to engage with the region. If the EU
continues to struggle with its enlargement consensus, the Western Balkans, and more specifically
Serbia, may become restless. Belgrade is happy to be “Russia’s privileged partner,” as Secrieru
states, and as long as they receive support from both Russia and the EU there is no incentive to
change their foreign policy. As stated above, the rise of Eurosceptic parties and leaders makes
Serbia’s accession a time-sensitive issue.
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Kosovo’s Fight for Legitimacy: An Overview
Conflict Build-up
Kosovo is stuck in what can be considered unfinished statehood; meaning it has qualities
of both a sovereign state and a stateless nation. Within the region, the ethnic make-up is an
Albanian majority and a Serbian minority. Kosovo became part of Serbia early in the 20th
century and was officially recognized as a province of Serbia following the second world war.
The Serbian minority and Serbian government viewed this incorporation as the rightful return of
territory. In contrast, the Albanian majority was outraged and viewed this move as an annexation
that effectively marginalized the majority (Congressional Research Service 2020). When
Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991 Kosovo lost its status as a federal entity, and its autonomy was
abolished by Serbia. Throughout the 1990s, Serbian authorities excessively discriminated against
Kosovo’s Albanians (Kosovars). The marginalized group was excluded from administrative,
health and education systems (Rohan 2018). Riots held by Kosovars ensued as thousands were
put out of work and restrictions were placed on their gatherings and cultural organizations. Mass
amounts of oppression and marginalization led by Slobodan Milosevic – former president of
Serbia charged with multiple counts of war crimes – leads to the secret vote and creation of the
Republic of Kosovo in 1991, which earned little international recognition (PBS 2017). Over the
next five years, little changed, and Kosovo’s struggles were overshadowed by the war in Bosnia.
Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova – elected during the secret vote – pursued a pacifist strategy
of peaceful resistance during that time, but there was a distinct lack of progress. Starting in 1996
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commences sporadic attacks against Serbian officials in
Kosovo, leading to intensified repression, massive military operations, and atrocious acts from
the Serbian government.
Outside Intervention
After failed negotiation discussions between the involved parties, NATO decided to
intervene on Kosovo’s behalf in March 1999 (Rohan 2018). However, this resulted in Serbian
retaliation and subsequently led to 800,000 displaced Kosovars. NATO airstrikes thus continued
for approximately three months until President Milosevic finally agreed to withdraw all security
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forces from Kosovo. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1244 which
established a UN-led interim administration. Furthermore, this resolution asserted that Kosovo
still belonged “de jure” to Serbia but was a UN protectorate. In 2006 the political process began
to establish an independent democracy and decide Kosovo’s future role on the world stage.
Seventeen rounds of negotiations were held in Vienna between Serbian and Kosovar delegations
as well as a Contact Group that consisted of Germany, France, Italy, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Along with the UN, the Contact Group stipulated principles of a
peace settlement which stated Kosovo’s future status must ensure multiethnicity cooperation and
insurance that government participation would be allowed for all communities. The Republic of
Kosovo formally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. Kosovo’s recognition around
the world has increased since 1999. As it stands, 111 member states of the UN formally
recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state.

Serbia’s Prospective Accession into the European Union
Normalization
Relations between Serbia and Kosovo following the 2008 declaration of independence
were hostile. Although tensions did not amount to violence, all ambassadors from countries that
formally recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty were expelled from Serbia. Since 2008, countless
steps were taken to normalize relations between the two, which have been led by the European
Union (EU). By mitigating the normalization process, the EU ultimately hopes that Serbia will
formally recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Decreasing tensions in the Western Balkans
will allow both Serbia and Kosovo to move forward and make substantial progress towards EU
accession, increasing their influence in the region. In 2013 a 15-point bilateral agreement
between the two entities was signed. The “First Agreement of Principles Governing the
Normalization of Relations” is a historic achievement between Serbia and Kosovo. However,
Serbia’s motives can hardly be categorized under Europeanization. While the EU dangles many
carrots for Serbian accession, the country pursues foreign relationships – in particular with
Russia – that allow them to reap the benefits. Serbia’s foreign policy is that of non-alignment,
meaning it pursues relations with multiple different actors each with their own advantages (DG
for External Policies 2017). Based on its foreign policy objectives, this study argues that Serbia
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will pursue any avenue that provides political and economic opportunism. With that being said,
Serbia will only commit to full normalization – meaning acknowledging Kosovo’s
independence – if there are material benefits from the declaration, which diminishes the power
of membership’s incentive. Another obstacle to normalization is the fact that Serbia views the
process as a threat to its sovereignty since the process implies Kosovo’s eventual recognition
(Wochnik 2012). The normalization process has the potential to drive Serbia even farther from
Europeanization and even decrease their desire to become an EU member state, hindering the
EU’s plans for Western Balkan integration.
How Kosovo Plays a Role
Serbia’s refusal to accept Kosovo as an independent nation is detrimental to its EU
accession. As its candidacy aspirations continue, Serbia fails to completely Europeanize its
foreign policy in regard to Kosovo (Wochnik 2012). In other words, the incentive of EU
membership fails to encourage Serbia to normalize its relations with Kosovo in a way that is
completely in line with EU standards. However, there is currently no official conditionality
clause that exists in which Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it wants to join the EU. Despite the
lack of a formal clause, or perhaps due to the lack of a clause, relations are at a standstill. As it
stands Serbia is not required to recognize Kosovo’s independence as a condition of EU
membership. A requirement for Western Balkans states to join the EU is “good neighborly
relations and regional cooperation” (Wochnik 2012). There is an underlying implication that the
Serbia-Kosovo deadlock must be resolved in order for accession to be complete. In the longterm, the EU envisions a completely integrated Western Balkans that includes Kosovo. This
vision will not be possible if member states block Serbia’s EU accession.
Further complications arise when one takes into account the lack of consensus amongst
current member states about Kosovo’s independence. The EU’s influence and role in the area is
undermined by its inability to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, a problem that
has decreased the institution’s own credibility (Chun 2011). The lack of unity and policy
consensus in regard to Kosovo’s independence hinders the accession of both Serbia and Kosovo
and risks deeper cleavages within the EU over enlargement policies. Due to a lack of consensus
on Kosovo’s statehood, the EU has no official policy on its recognition. Batt (2005) asserts that
the EU’s commitment to Western Balkan integration is contingent on the transformation of the
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region into that of a peaceful and prosperous area. The idea is that Serbia will redefine its
national and foreign policy interests based on incentives that the EU offers. However, it is
difficult to present the ultimatum of “Kosovo or Europe” when not all EU member states
recognize Kosovo as an independent state. For an organization based on unity, this lack of policy
consensus creates a stalemate amongst decision-makers. Five member states do not recognize
Kosovo as an independent nation; Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece. These
member states fear that Kosovo’s secession will ignite movements within their own borders
(Vicere 2019). In order to uphold the stance of the other 22 member states that do in fact
recognize Kosovo, the EU has adopted a status-neutral position, allowing it to mediate relations
between Kosovo and Serbia without bias. However, this lack of policy consensus within the EU
limits its enlargement capabilities and diminishes its goals of territorial peace and democracy
within the Western Balkans.
Geopolitical Constraints and European Union Conditionality
The Western Balkans have a tradition of instability and conflict in the post-Yugoslavia
world. EU conditionality and international pressure have been the most effective tools in eliciting
cooperation and stability in the region. The EU uses soft-power by incentivizing membership to
ensure Western Balkan states comply with the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Hartmann 2009). In the case of Croatia, strict EU conditionality
and ICTY cooperation strengthened pro-EU forces in the country and led the emergence of a
consensus on EU accession. Serbia, on the other hand, is resistant to Europeanization. Yet the
EU makes compromises in terms of conditionality, which now is applied selectively due to the
differences between each Western Balkan candidate. In other words, the EU is more lenient
towards Serbia because it is a “special case,” already adjusting the process from that of Croatia.
Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has been resistant to the spirit of ultimate reform. The
EU has proven it is willing to selectively apply the conditionality clause in order to maintain the
carrot of membership. This strategy will not be effective in truly accomplishing democratization
and Europeanization in the long-run, which are two values that the EU cannot compromise for
the sake of the bloc.
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Serbia-Russia Relations
Serbia continues to remain a candidacy country, which opens the door for its traditional
Slavic ally Russia. Despite the EU’s attractiveness in regard to trade, investment, aid and
stability, Russia has offered political support for Serbia in its stance against Kosovo’s
recognition. Russia does not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, a move which Serbia has
reciprocated by refusing to impose sanctions against Russian as a reaction to Crimea (DG for
External Policies 2017). Its policy of amity and cooperation with Serbia underscore Russia’s
desire to be influential in the Western Balkans, undermining EU enlargement and integration
policies. Russia and Serbia’s historical Slovac relationship, exacerbated by the Kosovo dispute,
can be detrimental in the long-term and has the potential to cripple Serbia’s chances of EU
accession (Radeljic 2016). In the same token, it can also push Serbia towards closer EU relations
if Serbia chooses to align its values and foreign policy with those of the West. EU accession
negotiations and enlargement objectives have not derailed Russia from its relations with Serbia,
and its influence in the candidate state remains strong after its recent backsliding.

Examining Member States’ Positions: Classifications
Member State Positions
Member States
Non-recognizers
Cyprus, Spain
and Non-engagers
Non-recognizers
and engagers

Greece, Romania, Slovakia

Recognizers

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden

Non-recognizers and Non-engagers
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Spain’s Position. Spain is the most influential EU member state that refuses to recognize
Kosovo as a sovereign independent state. It’s decision to not recognize Kosovo’s independence
is political and cultural in nature. By supporting its sovereignty, Spain would be accused of
promoting secessionist movements and the aspirations of independentist politicians (McShane
2011). Spain has outwardly declared that it considers the right of self-determination and
secessionist movements as illegal and has accused Kosovo of violating international law, and has
been extremely sympathetic towards Serbia. Spain’s refusal to recognize Kosovo stems from its
own vehement denial of Catalonia’s secession as legal and legitimate. Despite the fact that all the
major EU countries have recognized Kosovo, Spain has managed to diminish the possibility of
an EU consensus on its foreign policy position by equating Catalonia and Kosovo. Given the
recent 2017 declaration that Catalonia’s independence referendum was unlawful, Spain’s
position against Kosovo has only hardened. Forecasts do not predict that Spain will change its
position on the matter in the near future which does not bode well for Kosovo’s accession
prospects and the EU’s vision of enlargement in the Western Balkans. Spain has even gone as far
as to say that despite the EU’s well-wishes for the region, enlargement is not to be used as a
conflict-prevention instrument (Rettman 2018).
Spain clearly does not support the enlargement strategy that the EU is currently pursuing,
making a distinction between the enlargement process and political ambitions in the Western
Balkans. Out of the five member states that do not recognize Kosovo, Spain is the most
outspoken and has the toughest stance that some may argue is even more hard-lined than that of
Russia and Serbia. Spain refuses any official meetings with Kosovar authorities and continuously
reject Kosovo visas and passports. On top of that, Spain repeatedly votes against Kosovo’s
accession into other international organizations such as UNESCO and FIFA (Demjaha 2019).
The only conceivable way that Spain can reverse its position is if Serbia formally recognizes
Kosovo and redraws its borders. If an official normalization agreement were signed, or a special
clause were written into Serbia’s accession agreement, Spain would have no choice in the matter
but to recognize Kosovo. Until this is achieved, the EU must adapt to this position and find new
means to achieve consensus on Serbian accession, while still ensuring Kosovo’s accession and
recognition remain on the table.
Cyprus’ Position. From the onset Cyprus has positioned itself against Kosovo’s
statehood, citing international law and respect of human rights as its premier reasoning. Due to
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the consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation, Cyprus is steadfast in its refusal to
recognize Kosovo and instead stipulates that its sovereignty must be determined by negotiations
between Kosovo and Serbia (Ioannides 2017). For reasons mentioned above, Kosovar visas and
travel documents are not recognized in Cyprus, and it voted against Pristina’s application for
UNESCO membership. It position is supported by its declaration that Kosovo’s independence is
not in line with international law and that the right of self-determination does not give a nation
legal competence to secede. Like Spain, Cyprus’ motivations and its position are hard-lined and
based on core values and concerns. Serbia maintains close ties with Cyprus and is the only
Western Balkan state with successful trade and tourism relations. Due to its value-based foreign
policy and close ties with Serbia, Cyprus does not pursue an engagement policy with Kosovo.
This is not likely to change unless the UN Security Council approves a settlement between
Serbia and Kosovo. Cyprus will not take a harder stance than Serbia and will follow suit if it
formally recognizes Kosovo and comes to a normalization agreement.
Non-Recognizers and Engagers
Greece’s Position. Unlike Spain, Greece is not as vocal nor assertive on its nonrecognition position, and actually pursues a strong policy of engagement with Pristina. Out of the
five member states that do not recognize Kosovo, Greece has the most substantial political and
economic interests in the Western Balkans. Greece defended its non-recognition position,
explaining that it is based on respect for international law, the territorial integrity of states, and
regional stability in the Western Balkans (Armakolas 2017). Its position is somewhat motivated
by concerns that Kosovo will set a precedent for Cyprus, albeit not as strong as Spain’s disdain
of Catalonia’s secession. While other non-recognizers do not have liaison offices in Pristina,
Greece maintains an embassy in Kosovo’s capital (Armakolas 2017). There have been numerous
formal as well as informal meetings between the two since 2008, and more importantly Greece
recognizes Kosovar travel document which both Spain and Cyprus fail to do. Greek officials
have not ruled out a decision to recognize Kosovo by stating that Greece will support any
Kosovo status that results from legal, mutual, and negotiated agreements and normalization
between Kosovo and Serbia. Greece’s aspirations are in line with EU enlargement policy and it
formally aims to promote the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU. Greece is
committed to promoting bilateral trade and investment with Kosovo, and trade relations, as well
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as economic connections, are strengthening between the two. This implies that at some point
Greece will truly consider recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state, or that Greece expects there
to be a special clause written into Serbia’s accession negotiation.
Romania’s Position. Romania’s position within the EU is not as influential as the likes
of Spain and Greece, yet the member states prove that relations with Kosovo and the position’s
on engagement can evolve over time. Its reasons for non-recognition are embedded in
international law and the fact that Kosovo may set a risky precedent for other separatist
movements, such as pro-Russian separatists in Romania (Ivan 2017). In 2011 the Romanian
president declined to participate in a meeting of heads of state in Warsaw with former US
President Obama because Kosovo would be present at the meetings. Since then, Romania has
loosened its non-recognition position and organized several multilateral meetings with Kosovo.
Romania is now a key contributor to Kosovo’s development and integration with other EU
member states. Its close ties with Serbia suggest that Romania’s position will only be officially
altered when Kosovo is formally recognized by Serbia and will adapt its position accordingly.
Slovakia’s Position. Despite its refusal to recognize Kosovo, Slovakia makes it
abundantly clear that is willing to engage with the disputed state. Much like Romania and
Greece, Slovakia insisted that Kosovo’s independence was to be a matter decided mutually with
Serbia. However, from 2008 forward Slovakia has maintained a liaison office within Kosovo,
holds consistent meetings with officials in Kosovo, and recognizes Kosovar travel documents
and visas. Slovakia is so deeply engaged in Kosovo relations that it appeared as if it were ready
to change its position and formally recognize Kosovo (Nič 2017), with speculations this move
would be in conjuncture with Greece and Romania. Although no move was actually carried out,
the engagement between Slovakia and Kosovo remains strong.
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Reason for Refusing to Recognize Kosovo’s Statehood
Spain
Violation of
International
Law

Cyprus
✔

Greece

✔

✔

Romania

Slovakia

✔

✔

Ties with
Serbia
Concern of
Internal
Secession
Movement

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Recognizers and Engagers
Germany’s Position. Germany, along with France, is one of the most influential EU
member states. Its own foreign policy is linked with that of the EU, meaning its policies are
deeply embedded in integration, cooperation, and European values. Germany’s regional role in
the Western Balkans continues to grow, especially considering as of January 2020, Kosovo lost
its other biggest supporter in the EU due to Brexit. Its dedication to the integration of Europe and
enlargement of the EU encourages Germany to actively pursue Kosovo’s statehood and
independence. Germany even goes one step further than the other 21 member states that
recognize Kosovo by actively pressuring Serbia to normalize its relations, gaining more bilateral
recognition, and advocating for Kosovo’s membership in additional international organizations.
Germany has been instrumental in garnering high recognition numbers amongst EU member
states, acting as the most outspoken advocate of Kosovo’s sovereign statehood (Himmrich 2017).
Germany makes it clear that Serbia must commit to normalized relations with Serbia in order to
move ahead in the accession process. Furthermore, Germany will not support Serbia’s
membership ambitions if the Kosovo question is not addressed properly prior to accession.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Germany will support a special conditionality clause written
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into Serbia’s accession negotiations. Its visions of integration and its commitment to EU
enlargement are not be mistaken for desperation. Germany will not cut corners in order to satisfy
its foreign policy and EU goals. Germany will not consider Serbia’s accession if Kosovo is not
addressed, and its ambitions for regional stability in the Western Balkans include Kosovo’s own
accession into the EU.

The European Union’s Enlargement Process: Croatia versus Serbia

Population
Size

Ethnic
Populations

Current
Conflicts

Date of
SAA

Date of
Official
Candidacy

Date of
Accession
Negotiations

Date of Official
(or Perceived)
Membership

Croatia

4.3 million

90.4 %
Croat and
4.4 % Serbs

None

2001

2004

2005-2011

2013

Serbia

8.7 million

83 % Serbs,
3.5 %
Hungarian,
and 0.8%
Croats

Kosovo’s
statehood

2013

2012

2014-present

2025

Post-war Identity
Croatia was the first in a series of similar states in the EU’s enlargement plan for the
Western Balkans. The region was plagued with internal and external ethnic conflicts and border
disputes during the 1990s. Its accession to the EU was the most complex process of integration
up until now when more Western Balkan states are moving closer to accession. The proceeding
section will highlight the reasons why Croatia is the first successful case of Western Balkan
enlargement and how that differs from Serbia’s accession by examining multiple factors of the
process and of the individual cases. It is important to note that Croatia distinguishes itself from
its neighbors by arguing that regional candidates are far behind in terms of post-war
reconstruction and democratization (Jovic 2011). Croatia asserts that its Western Balkan
neighbors still have unresolved internal issues and open disputes with neighbors, as is the case
with Serbia and Kosovo. The newest member state made a point to differentiate itself from
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Western Balkan neighbors and argued that this grouping would only hinder its own chances of
accession. In almost all cases of war, there is a perceived winner and a clear loser, as well as the
typical “good guy” versus the “bad guy.” Following the conflict in the 1990s, Croatia was
viewed not only as the winner but also as the victim of war and foreign aggression. The ethnic
Serbs living in Croatia were labeled as foreign invaders despite the fact that they did not come
from anywhere else and had roots in Croatia. This image was reflected not only within Croatia
but also projected itself among the EU. With that being said, Croatia was not exempt from postwar obligations that would ensure its accession, but nonetheless it was granted EU membership
well before any of its Western Balkan neighbors may achieve the same feat.
Serbia has faced countless setbacks in terms of democratization and Europeanization
since the 1990s. Its continued dispute with Kosovo paints the image of an unstable political
environment, which makes them both a less than ideal candidate. Furthermore, while the EU
continues to approach Western Balkan enlargement in the same manner, Serbia’s western values
and support for EU membership are waning. Given that the majority of EU member states
recognize Kosovo as legitimate, Serbia is seen as denying a country its sovereignty and
independence. This does not sit well with Kosovo-recognizers. Who view this as oppressive and
harmful to the region’s stability. Therefore, Kosovo is seen as the loser and the victim in this
situation, meaning Serbia’s accession cannot be approached the same way as Croatia’s simply in
terms of post-war identities.
Stabilization and Association Process
The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is the EU’s soft power policy towards
the Western Balkans. It was developed with intentions of offering bigger incentives but also had
more demanding conditions and an emphasis on regional cooperation (Fisher 2005). The SAP is
guided by the principle of conditionality based on the candidate country’s compliance with the
Copenhagen Criteria, allowing the EU to control the pace of the enlargement process in the
Western Balkans. In 2001, Croatia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
and formally started accession negotiations by creating a contractual relationship with the EU
(Horopakha 2018). This agreement stipulated the gradual implementation of a free trade area and
a dedication to reforms towards EU values and standards that would eventually steer Croatia to
EU membership. The SAP was the basis of political dialogue for regional cooperation due to the
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fact that it encouraged Croatia to promote European integration to its regional neighbors. It also
contributed to the deepening of trade and economic relations by providing mechanisms for
management and monitoring all areas or relations (Horopakha 2018).
Regional cooperation is a key element to the EU’s Western Balkan enlargement plan.
With that being said, the SAP is a bilateral and regional tool that encourages cooperation with
both regional neighbors and the EU. Initial negotiations on an SAA with Serbia began in 2005
but were postponed in 2006 because of Serbia’s failure to cooperate fully with the ICTY and
other political obstacles (Minic 2007). However, an official SAA went into force in 2013
following and official declaration of candidacy in 2012. Serbia’s failure to adhere to political
policies and democratization proved to be a factor in its decelerating accession when
negotiations were halted in 2006. This exposes a pattern of backsliding and inconsistency when
compared to the process of Croatia. Despite their regional similarity, the two are incomparable
when it comes to post-war stabilization and willingness to fully cooperate with the EU. Within
Croatia there was a complete desire and consensus among politicians that EU membership was
the ultimate goal, and there was not a single anti-EU party in the parliament (Sabic 2019). This
also leads to the conclusion that Croatia prioritized EU accession more than Serbia does, which
means incentivizing membership is not the most effective soft power tool in dealing with the
Kosovo dispute. SAP and SAAs are the most unique and adaptable tool that the EU uses in its
Western Balkan enlargement plan because it is specific to each candidate, meaning it is flexible
and specialized by nature.
Adhering to the Acquis Communataire
Western Balkan enlargement is unique from previous EU expansions, and the process
was adjusted with Croatia’s accession. When negotiations were started, key problems of the
region were identified and the acquis communataire was refined accordingly. From Croatia’s
accession onward, the acquis will now include justice and fundamental rights taking into account
the protection of ethnic minorities and war crime issues of the 1990s (Sabic 2019). Croatia had
been exposed to the most advanced set of acquis criteria up until that point by raising the number
of chapters from 31 to 35, underscoring the EU’s ability to change the accession process where it
sees fit. Furthermore, the SAP took over as the most important carrot tool for the EU because it
imposed specific guidelines for each country. Thus, the EU is willing to adapt its process for
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each state in the Western Balkans, but Serbia’s accession is even more unique and will require
more substantial adjustments.

Conclusions
Consensus and its Effect on Western Balkan Enlargement
Despite the fact that all member states support Serbia’s accession into the EU, the process
is slowing substantially due to a lack of consensus over Kosovo’s recognition. This is the first
time in the history of EU enlargement policy that a candidate’s accession is blocked by a non-EU
actor. Not all member states share the same interests when it comes to enlargement, which is
apparent in the dispute over Kosovo’s legitimacy. The five member states that do not recognize
Kosovo’s statehood manage to slow down Serbia’s accession process unintentionally as a result
of the opposition. Member states that do recognize Kosovo are not as vocal as the nonrecognizers, aside from Germany. Yet even Germany’s influence is not powerful or effective
enough to persuade non-recognizers to change their position, which is deeply embedded in fears
of secessionist disputes within their own states. Although Greece, Romania, and Slovakia are
willing to engage with Kosovo, their own relations with Serbia imply that positions will only
change if Serbia itself recognizes Kosovo as a sovereign state. Lack of consensus over the
Kosovo dispute is detrimental to Serbia’s EU aspirations. Furthermore, it destroys the EU’s
Western Balkan enlargement plan until the dispute is settled in some manner. As the EU
struggles to find a principled pragmatism approach to Serbia’s accession, Russia is redefining its
relationship and its expanding influence in the Western Balkans. Its definitive stance on Kosovo
it is a political move that unites Serbia with its historical Slavic ally, and creates a more positive
view of Russia over the EU. As accession negotiations decelerate, Russian influence increases
and threatens to diminish the relevance of EU membership, which will effectively disincentivize
accession. This point of contention is not the main focus of this study, but nonetheless it is an
important revelation that EU decision-makers must be aware of. Serbia’s accession is a timesensitive issue and must be completed sooner rather than later. Given that non-recognizers’
positions are unlikely to change in the near future the EU must pursue new avenues to address
the Kosovo dispute and complete Serbia’s accession.

16

Adapting to Serbia’s Unique Position
Based on the evidence presented in this study it can be concluded that conditionality and
SAAs are the most effective soft power tools in enlargement. The SAA with Croatia was
successful in incentivizing EU membership while effectively Europeanizing the Western Balkan
state. Thus, Croatia is a prime example of what an SAA is capable of when catered to the
specific state rather than the Copenhagen Criteria which is generic and used for every candidate.
Therefore, this study puts forth the recommendation that a special conditionality clause regarding
Kosovo must be written into the Serbia SAA or final accession document. Noting that five EU
member states are likely to remain non-recognizers unless Serbia miraculously changes, it is
illogical to imply that Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it wants to become a member state.
Furthermore, Russia relations are diminishing the influence that the EU has in Serbia, making the
EU’s carrot less effective than initially thought. In order to complete Serbia’s accession process,
the EU must stipulate that Serbia cannot veto Kosovo’s membership if the day arises, despite its
position on Kosovo’s statehood. This would secure Serbia’s membership while simultaneously
leaving the door open for the EU’s full Western Balkans enlargement plan. This alternative will
also quell the current consensus dispute over Serbia’s accession between the recognizers and
non-recognizers. It is advantageous for the EU to pursue this alternative in order to accelerate
Serbia’s accession due to Russia’s rising influence, as well as set up a mechanism to settle the
Kosovo dispute in other ways than the failed normalization negotiations. It is imperative that the
EU is successful in its enlargement, democratization, and Europeanization of the Western
Balkans to maintain its partnership and promote stability within the region. Ultimately this study
does not adequately address the future of Kosovo’s accession, and therefore there is room for
further research on this matter that would help to better explain the complications of enlargement
in the Western Balkans.
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